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On “Rationality” in Criminal Law1
Questions regarding the most desirable criminal policy and the reform 
of criminal law constitute one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of 
law. In answering them, both professionals and non-professionals argue 
that criminal law and criminal policy (with respect to both law enact-
ment and application) should be rational and effective. This comes as 
no surprise if it is borne in mind that rationality and effectiveness are 
among the principal criteria for assessing any social activity. Moreover, 
citing “rationality” and “effectiveness” in social practice has become 
one of the most powerful means of persuasion, and the charge of irra-
tionality in making a decision, similar to the charge of non-sequitur in 
drawing conclusions, is one of the strongest rhetorical arguments.2 More 
important than their persuasive power, however, is the fact that the two 
concepts are used to legitimate enacted law. Regardless of what can be 
said about the ambiguity of the concept of rationality and its inadequacy 
for legal phenomena, it must be remembered that 
[…] the directive which states that when describing someone’s behaviour, 
or the products of their activity, one must assume that this behaviour is 
1 Translated from: B. Janiszewski, Rozważania o “racjonalności” w dziedzinie prawa kar-
nego, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1996, 4 by Tomasz Żebrowski and 
proofread by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation and proofreading were 
financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018.
2 L. Morawski, Argumentacje, racjonalność prawa i postępowanie dowodowe, Toruń 1988, 
p. 51.
Bogusław Janiszewski
414 | Bogusław Janiszewski
rational from a human point of view, is a methodological directive com-
mon to much of the humanities. What is more, it is posited that this as-
sumption is a distinguishing factor for the humanities.3 
The argument that law is in need of “rationalising”, which has been 
made in Poland with particular insistence since 1989, obviously con-
cerns not only criminal law, but also the legal system and legal policy 
as a whole.4 When applied to criminal law, however, it is associated 
with some very specific problems. From among all the legal disciplines, 
it is in criminal law that any shortcomings in rationality and effective-
ness become particularly pronounced. Paradoxically, as Karl-Ludwig 
Kunz—the Austrian criminal law expert—stresses, it is in this field that 
such requirements are formulated in the strongest possible terms.5 
Undertaken from the perspective of criminal law expertise, the fol-
lowing considerations attempt to assess the necessity and feasibility of 
evaluating criminal law and criminal policy by using the criterion of ra-
tionality. The attempt is conducted with an awareness of the controver-
sies currently associated with the understanding of “rationality”, and of 
the issues presently animating the development of philosophical and le-
gal thought. 
2. In the explanatory memoranda to the successive versions of the 
draft criminal code which have been published in recent years, men-
tion is often made of the need to develop a “rational criminal policy”. 
The 1995 memorandum reads: “… the draft designs the penal conse-
quences of a prohibited act and principles for sentencing, taking into 
account the needs of a rational criminal policy, in order … that the 
court will be able to make a rational choice of punishment or criminal 
3 Z. Ziembiński, Metodologiczne zagadnienia prawoznawstwa, Warszawa 1974, p. 115. 
Cf. K. Szaniawski, Racjonalność jako wartość, “Studia Filozoficzne” 1983, no. 5–6.
4 S. Wronkowska in: A. Redelbach, S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii państwa 
i prawa, Warszawa 1993, p. 164 ff.
5 K. L. Kunz, Einige Gedanken über Rationalität und Effizienz des Rechts, in: Strafgerechtig-
keit, Festschrift für Arthur Kaufmann zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. F. Haft, Heidelberg 1993, 
p. 192.
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policy measure”.6 Some of the statements made by the drafters sug-
gest a rather “procedural” understanding of rationality, in the sense 
that the authorities which apply the law should adhere to the rules 
of efficient operation. Other statements, in turn, refer to the evalua-
tive plane, such as the sentence: “the draft provides for a system of 
sanctions helping the pursuit of a rational criminal policy which will 
be in line with contemporary tendencies”.7 It is widely-known, how-
ever, that special sentencing principles and guidelines, and even pe-
nal sanctions themselves, contain axiological declarations. Moreover, 
sanctions implicitly indicate what weight is attached to a protected in-
terest. The explanatory memorandum to the draft clearly states that the 
draft provisions on the term and degree of punishment “… differ radi-
cally from those in the 1969 Criminal Code, which were an expres-
sion of a different penal philosophy; one inconsistent with the spirit of 
a democratic state ruled by law”.8 As can be seen, regardless of how 
“rationality” is understood, the draft applies this concept to different 
components of criminal policy, in other words to legislative decisions, 
and to decisions taken at various stages of criminal law enforcement. 
On this level of generality, the requirement that law be rational can 
hardly be treated in any other way than as a general guideline; it would 
be equally difficult to reconstruct its deeper meaning here. 
In Polish criminal law scholarship, Lech Gardocki subjects the 
question of rationality to a broad analysis when focusing on the issue 
criminalisation. He believes that criminalisation is effected for ratio-
nal reasons (“is rational”) when it expresses the legislator’s intention to 
bring about certain effects, which does not mean that such criminalisa-
tion can indeed bring about these intended effects, or that such effects 
6 Draft criminal code, unpublished explanatory memorandum. Warszawa 1995, pp. 21–22. 
“This recognition is, however, limited by Constitutional principles and axiology expressed in 
principles and directives concerning the term and amount of punishment and other means”.
7 Ibidem, p. 36.
8 Draft criminal code with an explanatory memorandum, 1994, p. 35.
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must meet with society’s approval.9 For instance, the purposes of ratio-
nal criminalisation may include: protecting a legal interest, reinforcing 
moral attitudes, relieving social tensions, symbolically confirming cer-
tain values, disciplining society, and stressing the idea of social justice. 
Thus, for example, Gardocki expresses the view that witch trials were, 
according to the knowledge held at that time, an example of rational 
criminalisation.10 
In contrast, according to Gardocki, irrational reasons for criminal-
isation include various emotional ones, in the invoking of which the 
legislator appeals to intuitions that a certain type of behaviour is repre-
hensible. Today, however, the real, emotional reasons for criminalisa-
tion are sometimes concealed under the guise of rational justifications. 
Gardocki claims that emotional criminalisation is based on punishing 
“because” (a crime has been committed) and not on punishing “in order 
to” (achieve a goal). As an example of emotional criminalisation (which 
can be fully approved), he includes the criminalisation of any sexual 
acts between adults and children.11 
In this last assertion, Gardocki clearly refers to the juxtaposition 
of the criminal law based on retribution to that geared to prevention, 
in other words, the juxtaposition of the demands of justice with those of 
the effectiveness of punishment. The choice between these approaches 
and tasks is a fundamental moral choice present in the legal discipline in 
question, in both the legislative and judicial domains.12 Additionally, 
it is worth mentioning in this regard that, according to today’s under-
standing of this issue, punishing “because a crime has been commit-
ted” does not only involve emotions related to retribution. Punishment 
implementing the idea of justice has been used as a regulator of certain 
9 L. Gardocki, Zagadnienia teorii kryminalizacji, Warszawa 1990.
10 Ibidem, p. 53 ff. The subject of this work is, in the words of its author, a descriptive and not 
a normative study of criminalisation. 
11 Ibidem, p. 83.
12 Cf. W. Sadurski, Teoria sprawiedliwości. Podstawowe zagadnienia, Warszawa 1988, 
p. 267.
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social and individual types of behaviour; hence, it has important goals 
to fulfil.13 In practice, various compromises are obviously made between 
these two approaches.14 
3. Among criminal law experts, it seems that the common-sense un-
derstanding of “rationality” is quite widespread: meaning the selection 
of appropriate means for achieving previously set goals, taking into ac-
count up-to-date scientific knowledge and commonly recognised values, 
including human rights.15 If such an understanding were adopted, other 
meanings of “rationality” could be ignored and the discussion could be 
limited to the rationality of the goals and means. The point is, however, 
that the meanings of “rational” depend on the object being assessed, to 
which they refer, while such objects vary within law. 
The definition of a criminal law system, Marian Cieślak writes, is 
a result of two factors. First, of rational thought that seeks to adjust 
optimally a given system to the current criminal policy so that criminal 
law becomes an efficient means for achieving the social ends that have 
been set for it. Second, it results from the “gravity of historical tradition 
and the inheritance of legal forms and patterns”.16 Unfortunately, there 
is no agreement in legal studies as to either the goals set or the proposed 
means, which is evident from the fact that jurists holding quite diver-
gent views on the same issue claim that their individual proposals are 
the only rational ones. These complications arise because of the natural 
pluralism, so to speak, of goals in criminal law, which are observable in 
both general and individual perspectives. There are, however, also other 
reasons for these complications. A careful examination of the textbook 
definitions of punishment leads to the conclusion that the fundamental 
13  Cf. U. Klug, Skeptische Rechtsphilosophie und humanes Strafrecht, vol. II, Materiälle und 
formälle Strafrechtsproblemmme, Berlin 1981; L. Lerneil, Podstawy nauki polityki krymi-
nalnej, Warszawa 1967.
14 W. Sadurski, op.cit., p. 230 ff.
15 H.-D. Schwind, “Rationale” Kriminalpolitik als Zukunftsaufgabe, in: Festschrift für Günt-
er Blau zum 70. Geburtstag, H.-D. ed. Schwind, Berlin, New York 1985; H. Zipf, Kriminal-
politik, Heidelberg 1980, p. 53.
16 M. Cieślak, Polskie prawo karne, zarys systemowego ujęcia, Warszawa 1994, p. 43.
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question of whether a criminal law response constitutes a condemnation 
of an act or of the perpetrator is currently not clearly formulated, and 
this leads to a plethora of consequences.
In criminal law, as in other branches of law, there are normative, 
instrumental, axiological and social elements.17 What makes this branch 
of law special, however, is its satisfaction of goals pertaining to justice, 
protection, guarantees and cooperation (consensual agreement in solv-
ing a conflict arising as a result of a crime). Taking into consideration 
all four different goals at the same time may lead to conflicts and in 
practice calls for making choices that may be assessed according to the 
criterion of rationality. Criminal policy, as Günther Kaiser writes, fits 
between criminological, criminal-law and political rationality.18 
4. To answer now the question about the admissibility and adequa-
cy of gauging law with the measure of rationality, it appears necessary 
to have a closer look at how this concept is understood in relation to 
law. There are two fundamental questions. The first concerns the ob-
ject—what can be sensibly referred to as “rational” within the scope of 
law; while the second pertains to the subjectivisation of this concept. 
As regards the latter issue, it is indisputable that the truth of a sen-
tence or the rightness of a moral judgment does not depend on the per-
son uttering it. However, in the case of the term “rational”, the situation 
is quite different. The convictions that one has and the behaviour based 
on them are rational when there are “good reasons” for considering 
them true, morally right, etc. Yet, the truth and moral rightness, etc. of 
some convictions are not necessary conditions, and perhaps not suffi-
cient conditions either, for considering them rational. A conviction may 
be rational even if it is false. This could be the case when an individual 
in a given situation has sufficient grounds for believing something is 
true and right. And vice versa, the rationality of a conviction may be 
17 J. Wróblewski, Teoria racjonalnego tworzenia prawa, Ossolineum, 1985, p. 179.
18 G. Kaiser, Perspektiven einer rationalen Kriminalpolitik, “Kriminalistik” 1992, no. 12, 
p. 737.
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questioned when, despite it being true, the individual has no grounds for 
accepting it.19 It is obvious that this understanding of rationality comes 
down solely to the assessment of the decision-making process of the 
person making the decision and concentrates on its formal side. 
It is also pointed out that there is a close connection between “ra-
tionality” and responsibility. Bernhard Peters observes that convictions, 
assertions or types of behaviour that can be described as rational are 
ones that a person can be responsible for, that can be somehow justi-
fied, or that lend themselves to being explained.20 With regard to the 
object being assessed, Peters says that we tend to make statements about 
the rationality of behaviour or convictions when we adopt the role of 
observers, or when we look at our own activity with the benefit of hind-
sight. According to Peters, when we assume the role of “participants” we 
do not argue about “rationality”, but rather about the truth or rightness 
of convictions, assertions, etc.21 However, it is difficult to agree with 
this assertion, because it is decision-makers that often try to make oth-
ers consider their decisions rational. 
Let us return to the first question—about the object, or what can 
be sensibly referred to as rational within law and a legal policy. Tak-
ing a broader view, it turns out that various scholarly disciplines have 
their specific research objectives, methods, criteria of judging effects 
and standards of criticism. Therefore, in a descriptive sense, there is talk 
of various “rationalities” or even various “logics of conduct”, including 
juridical and political rationality.22 What appears particularly important 
but also highly problematic is relating rationality to moral norms and 
judgments. 
19 B. Peters, Rationalität, Recht und Geselschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 176; 
cf. Z. Ziembiński, Metodologiczne zagadnienia…, op.cit., p. 116; L. Morawski, op.cit., 
p. 59.
20 B. Peters, op.cit., p. 172.
21 Ibidem, pp. 178, 217 ff.
22 Ibidem, p. 183.
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In these considerations on the concept of rationality, our interest is 
primarily focused on decisions, in particular decisions relating to enact-
ing and applying law. The rationality of such decisions is confirmed by 
two kinds of arguments: those expressing the decision-maker’s knowl-
edge and those expressing the preferences (values) they share.23 The 
study of the questions of rational law-making has produced the concepts 
of internally and externally rational decisions.24 Let us recall that inter-
nal rationality means a decision is supported by specific arguments and 
by the adopted rules of justified reasoning. The rationality of a deci-
sion thus understood is therefore its formal property, as it does not con-
cern the content of arguments or the rules of reasoning. In turn, a decision 
is externally rational if, in addition, its premises are judged to be sound. 
Such a judgment involves a comparison of the decision-maker’s knowl-
edge and preferences with those held by the person judging the decision. 
When knowledge and preferences are found to be consistent with each 
other, also with respect to the ordering of values, a legislative decision is 
judged to be externally rational; if not, it is judged externally irrational. 
If the judging person cannot find any justification at all for a given deci-
sion and the legislator has not formulated one either, then, in the opinion 
of Jerzy Wróblewski, the decision is simply irrational.25 This division of 
the rationality of legislative decisions seems to be an elaboration on the 
distinction between formal and substantive rationality attributed to Max 
Weber.26 Looking at this from the perspective of criminal law, one can 
express the conviction that stopping at the internal rationality of the de-
cision would be far from satisfactory.
5. Rationality in law has been much discussed in German schol-
arship, primarily due to the philosophical traditions and the need to 
23 J. Wróblewski, Rozumienie prawa i jego wykładnia, Ossolineum 1990, p. 109.
24 Ibidem; J. Wróblewski, Teoria…, op.cit., p. 161 ff.
25 J. Wróblewski, op.cit., p. 164.
26 Cf. K. Eder, Zur Rationalisierungsproblematik des modernen Rechts, in: Max Weber und 
die Rationalisierung sozialen Handelns, eds. W. M. Sprondel, C. Seyfarth, Stuttgart 1881, 
pp. 157 ff; B. Peters, op.cit., pp. 114–118.
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overcome the irrationality of law during the Nazi period. The German 
author Bernhard Peters, citing Jürgen Habermas, distinguishes three 
types of rationality: (1) cognitive-instrumental, (2) moral-practical, and 
(3) evaluative-expressive.27 
The most important standard of the first type is truth. The second 
is related to adopting the point of view of rightness and the appropri-
ate criterion of justification. The third has an entire gamut of standards, 
such as beauty, dignity, pleasure, etc. Furthermore, emphasis is rightly 
put on the difference in meaning between the “rationality” of human ac-
tivities (for instance, decisions) and such concepts as the truth (of state-
ments, for example), the moral rightness (of some norm or assessment) 
or appropriateness or validity (of some extra-moral values). All this sup-
ports the conclusion that “rationality” is by no means a hypernym for 
all these terms.28 However, the key point is that the kind of division that 
Habermas and Peters adopt, which clearly refers to the old distinction 
between the rationality of aims and values (Zweck- and Wertrational-
ität), appears to be adequate to the study of legal phenomena, especially 
because the first two types of rationality are distinguished. 
Doubts arise, however, with regard to Peter’s stance on the relation-
ship between the three distinguished types (dimensions) of rationality. 
Specifically, he does not allow for the possibility of a conflict between 
empirical-cognitive rationality and normative (moral, evaluative) ratio-
nality. In his opinion, the attribution of empirical-cognitive rationality 
only entails that the decision was based on the best knowledge avail-
able. However, knowledge alone is not supposed to provide any rec-
ommendations as to the course of action to be taken; all it does is in-
form about possible courses of action and their expected consequences. 
Whereas the goals that Peters describes as moral may in fact be conflict-
ing, for empirical reasons. All the three types (aspects) of rationality 
mentioned earlier are, according to Peters, independent conditions of the 
27 B. Peters, op.cit., p. 186 ff.
28 Ibidem, p. 171.
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“global rationality” of some type of behaviour, decision or norm. A lack 
of rationality in one of these dimensions cannot be made up for by its 
presence in another dimension. Hence if only one of them is judged to 
be “below the threshold of rationality”, the entire behaviour or decision 
cannot be justified, and is thus entirely irrational.29 
It appears that both of Peter’s positions as set out above are incor-
rect. First, a possible conflict between cognitive-empirical rationality 
and normative rationality may arise because when we speak of rational-
ity we have in mind the relationship between a decision made by taking 
advantage of knowledge and a decision made following some norms, 
and not the abstract relationship of objective knowledge alone to these 
norms. Second, it is for this reason that various kinds of rationality are 
distinguished: to be able to relativize the concept of rationality itself. 
Thus, the proposal to introduce yet another concept of global rationality 
may, perhaps, increase the regime of rationality, but at the same time 
increases the ambiguity of this concept. In such a general sense, a deci-
sion could possibly be judged optimal. 
In analyses of the concept of rationality, reference is often made 
to the distinction between formal and substantive rationality mentioned 
earlier. Peters situates formal rationality “across” the three dimensions 
of rationality he distinguishes,30 because he believes that formal criteria 
29 Ibidem, pp. 193–197. The global rationality of some behaviour would be the greater, the 
higher are the values of individual dimensions of rationality. It follows that one should 
choose such manners of behaviour that bring about the optimum of rationality in all the 
three dimensions. Ibidem, p. 193. Cf. R. Dreier, Irrationalismus in der Rechtswissenschaft, 
“Rechtstheorie Beiheft. Juristische Logik, Rationalität und Irrationalität im Recht” 1985, 
vol. 8. 
30 B. Peters, op.cit., p. 197 ff. Both the concepts of formal and substantive rationality, and the 
functions they have been given in jurisprudence have a rich history. They also played 
a practical role in countries whose legal systems witnessed a sharp turn from totalitarianism 
to democracy. The result of the evolution of views in post-war Germany is summed up by 
A. Kaufmann as follows: “Beklagenswerterweise hat aber auch hier wieder einmal unser 
Nationalcharakter bewirkt, dass die Dinge bis ins Extrem gesteigert wurden, nämlich bis 
zu einem völig inhaltsleeren Formalismus und Funktionalismus, dessen ‘Reinheit’ so steril 
geworden ist, dass sie nach nichts mehr schmeckt (Maihofer nennt diese Reinheit eine 
‘formalistische Amputation’ des Rechts)” A. Kaufmann, Recht und Rationalität, Gedanken 
beim Wiederlesen der Schriften von Werner Maihofer”. A. Kaufmann, E.-J. Mestmäcker, 
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play a specific role in justifying all three kinds of rationality: empirical, 
moral and evaluative. 
In Polish legal theory, Lech Morawski views the concept of “ratio-
nality” from another perspective, by relating it to the main objectives 
of efforts to transform reality by means of law.31 In his opinion, de-
cisions involved in enacting or applying the law may concern either 
increasing the acceptability of the social order constituted by them or 
broadening communication—free from repression and founded on ethi-
cal norms—in social relations. To varying degrees, all these goals are 
actualised in the context of the fundamental functions of criminal law. 
Referring to these three ideas, Morawski distinguishes different corre-
sponding models of reasoning: (1) epistemic-technological, (2) rhetori-
cal-topical, and (3) communicative. The first can be reduced to the ques-
tion of the goals set and the means approved. In the second, every argu-
ment is related to a specific audience, and the type of audience decides 
which arguments are to be considered relevant and which are not. The 
communication model, in turn, may be linked to criminal law primarily 
when its role is taken into account in the cooperation aiming to resolve 
a conflict between the perpetrator and the victim of a crime. 
Morawski writes:
Each of these models takes a different view of what rational law is and 
how social interactions ought to be rationalised by means of law. Conse-
quently, each adopts a different conception of enacting and applying law, 
has a different understanding of what law interpretation is, and the prob-
lem of establishing the factual state of affairs […] each of these models 
draws on a different ideology of enacting and applying law.32 
H.F. Zacker eds, Rechtsstaat und Menschenwürde, Festschrift für Werner Maihofer zum 70. 
Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 27.
31 L. Morawski, op.cit.
32 Ibidem, p. 8.
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A major claim made by Morawski is that a decision that is rational 
from the point of view of one model of reasoning does not have to be 
rational from the point of view of another model. As Morawski empha-
sizes, it is doubtful whether the idea of an effective order could replace 
the idea of a socially accepted order. These two kinds of rationality are 
simply different, and each may prove to be irrational from the point of 
view of the other, but this is no reason to eliminate one in favour of the 
other.33 
6. According to Kunz, as a component of social practice, law is en-
tangled in such diverse relationships that it cannot be defined strictly 
in accordance with the criterion of rationality.34 For law is a relative-
ly autonomous social medium, based on counterfactual normative as-
sumptions (“dogmas”) and subordinated to formalised procedural rules. 
Hence, an autonomy is manifested that prevents any direct shaping 
of social reality in accordance with the demands of effectiveness. In 
criminal law, in Kunz’s opinion, we are faced with a flight from scien-
tific-empirical analysis. This legal discipline uses many concepts that 
make empirical knowledge unnecessary and impossible to avail one-
self of in the decision-making process. They include such evaluative 
terms as “social harm”, “legal interest”, “sufficient suspicion of com-
mission of a prohibited act”, etc.35 The point is that, as Arthur Kaufmann 
stresses, the concepts of norm, duty and law are not free from references 
to values and, therefore, do not lend themselves to a strictly empirical 
approach.36 
33 Ibidem, p. 62.
34 K.-L. Kunz, op.cit., p. 188.
35 Ibidem, pp. 189, 195. Another example of “resistance to experience” discussed by 
K.-L. Kunz is general positive crime prevention. In the conclusion of his critical remarks 
on the insusceptibility of criminal law to empirical verification, he asserts that administra-
tion of justice may be treated more as an institution for administering crime than combating 
it. Ibidem, pp. 192, 194. 
36 A. Kaufmann, E.-J. Mestmäcker, H.F. Zacker eds, Rechtsstaat und Menschenwürde, Fest-
schrift für Werner Maihofer zum 70. Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 27.
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In the current criminal law scholarship, it is not uncommon for au-
thors to draw attention the limitations that the law supposedly reveals 
with regard to the requirement of rationality, which is usually under-
stood in an empirical sense. Criticism is sometimes levelled at criminal 
law itself for its failure to adapt to the modern canons of science. The 
discussions of such crucial problems as the concepts of acts and guilt, 
or the goals behind the severity of punishment, reveal the entire history 
of such disputes. On the other hand, the criterion of rationality is itself 
held to be inadequate for evaluating the law.37 To bring some order to 
these discussions, it could prove helpful to refer to the paradigms of 
legal dogmatics currently in place and use the criterion of rationality in 
a properly relativised manner, so that the object under evaluation and 
further evaluative criteria adequate to it would remain clear. Further-
more, it is equally important to make certain ontological assumptions 
with respect to the values themselves. 
Let us recall some fundamental issues: in the theory of law, atten-
tion is given to two models which serve as points of departure for the 
discussion on the nature of jurisprudence. One is designated as empiri-
cal, while the other as humanistic.38 The subject-matter of the former 
is the description of reality. In turn, the subject-matter of jurisprudence 
as a humanistic discipline is the understanding of facts, consisting in as-
cribing a sense, meaning or value to the material substrate of the facts. 
This is done through statements that are not necessarily true or false 
sentences. If the statements of humanistic disciplines are not sentences, 
they are subject to justification in terms of the adopted epistemic and 
axiological premises.39 In the study of law, both approaches—empirical 
and humanistic—maintain their relevance, but they are often wrongly 
37 K.-L. Kunz, op.cit.; C. v Mettenheim, Recht und Rationalität, Tübingen 1984, p. 62 ff.; 
H. Schüler-Springorum, Kriminalpolitik für Menschen, Frankfurt /M. 1991, pp. 174 ff. 
38 Cf. K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo, metodologia, filozofia teoria prawa, Warszawa 1991, 
pp. 36 ff. 
39 Ibidem, p. 37.
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considered equivalent in practice. Furthermore, the methods they use 
are not properly distinguished. 
7. Criminal policy, like many other social activities, requires effec-
tiveness to be placed on an equal footing with rationality. Without going 
into the various meanings of the former, it is observed that “effective-
ness is a condition of rationality”. “Rational law-making is by assump-
tion enacting effective law,” Wróblewski writes, but adds: “Effective-
ness is necessary, but does not suffice, since a rational lawmaker must 
also implement other values”.40 Moreover, in relation to the application 
of law, one can also speak of the rationality of goals, means and the 
results achieved. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary 
to specify exactly what effectiveness is at stake and in accordance with 
what dimension of rationality we formulate our assessments.
The effectiveness of law, meaning its ability to achieve set goals, is 
considered one of the principal reasons for criminalisation. Of course, be-
fore an act is criminalised, it is only possible to make predictions, while an 
empirical study of effectiveness can be carried out ex post.41 The effective-
ness of criminal law can be assessed in terms of its principal functions, 
which were mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the effects of criminalisation 
are sometimes discussed under the following three categories: protective, 
symbolic and educational.42 They are variously ranked in importance, de-
pending on the matter to which they refer, and are problematic when it 
comes to assessments according to the criterion of rationality. Gardocki 
draws attention to this issue.43 For instance, with respect to the protective 
effect, he stresses that the notion of “legal interest” is prone to manipula-
40  J. Wróblewski, Teoria…, op.cit., p. 250; “Legal rules […] are also assessed not in terms of 
goals they promote, but various fundamental axiological values that a given system of law 
implements (e.g. justice…). Thus, effectiveness must not be made a fetish—effectiveness is 
neither the only one, nor, as one could presume, the highest assessment criterion of the law 
in force”. Ibidem, p. 241. Cf. Z. Ziembiński, Metodologiczne…, op.cit., pp. 244 ff. 
41 L. Gardocki, op.cit., pp. 149 ff; H. Zipf, op.cit., pp. 54 ff.
42 M. Delmas-Marty, Analiza systemowa polityki kryminalnej, “Państwo i Prawo” 1985, 
vol. 11.
43 Ibidem, p. 162 ff.
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tion. It is facilitated by the difficulties with empirical verification caused 
by its very general or even ostensible formulation. In turn, “… owing to 
the ingenuity of interpreters, almost any provision may have an object of 
protection assigned to it, provided it is formulated sufficiently generally 
and obscurely”.44 As regards the symbolic effect, this involves passing an 
emphatically negative judgement on an act through its criminalisation, 
in spite of the fact that it may prove ineffective as far as prosecution and 
punishment are concerned. In this case, the general-educational goal of 
law may be achieved, despite the commonly held opinion that the crimi-
nalisation of acts that cannot be prosecuted depreciates the value of law 
and results in demoralization. The stance adopted with regard to this ef-
fect of criminalisation seems to depend on the weight of the interest to be 
protected and the preferences of the legislator. 
8. Certainly, the most interesting question—and at the same time the 
most difficult one—concerns the rationality of the values on which law 
rests, and which are also to be protected by law. Legal theorists empha-
sise that a major controversy of axiological studies is connected with the 
philosophical determination of an adopted methodology. The familiar is-
sue here is the recognition or refusal to recognise the existence of objec-
tive values, and thus their cognisability. For this reason, Kazimierz Opałek 
and Wróblewski argue that we have to contend with various models of 
scientificality, and thus of rationality.45 As Marek Piechowiak writes, to 
understand the foundations of law (not only its formal requirements, but 
also the basis of the content of just law), before we ask what is valuable 
we need to tackle the problem of what values are, and how they exist. 
The way in which the problems, foundations, content and goals of law are 
viewed depends on the answers to questions such as these.46 
44 Ibidem, p. 51.
45 K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, op.cit., p. 44. Cf. S. Wronkowska, op.cit. V. also a statement by 
Ziembiński on the consequences of the position of emotivism: O pojmowaniu pozytywizmu 
oraz prawa natury, Poznań 1993, pp. 21 ff.
46 M. Piechowiak, O wartościach i sprawiedliwości prawa paper delivered at the conference 
Justice, Ethics, Law—present-day dilemmas, Katowice 1992. 
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Yet another issue is the possibility of considering the value of law as 
a social institution, either generically or specifically. On the one hand, 
as Ziembiński emphasises, the arguments that are considered the most 
convincing are tied up with seeking approval for the social system law 
is supposed to serve. On the other hand, these are discussions of the axi-
ological justification of the particular institutions or norms of the legal 
system by appealing to the moral judgements of acts or the social results 
of acts indicated in these norms.47 
This article is limited to the question of the results obtained by the 
application of the rationality criterion to the moral choices underpinning 
legal norms and others that are made in the course of applying the law. 
Here two directions of this reflection can be outlined, reflecting the for-
mal and substantive understandings of rationality. 
In the context of rational law-making, rationality is a formal value in 
the strict sense.48 This entails, within the scope under discussion, the de-
mand that the system of values on which the legislator relies when making 
decisions should be properly ordered. Moreover, the values must first be 
formulated precisely enough and working out the principles of their pref-
erential character. In sum, the model of rational law-making developed 
by legal theory is said “…to be useful in every review of a specific ideol-
ogy or a specific normative law-making model”.49 Rationality, as a formal 
value of law, is independent of the substantial goals it implements. 
The formal values of law are instrumental in character: they are valu-
able on account of their usefulness in achieving specific substantive val-
ues. However, the rationality of law-making does not make law or its 
particular norms substantively rational. The question arises of whether, 
when addressing the axiological problems of the foundations of law, 
we can stop at appealing to the axiology of a democratic state ruled 
47 Z. Ziembiński, O stanowieniu i obowiązywaniu prawa zagadnienia podstawowe, Warsza-
wa 1995, p. 94.
48 J. Wróblewski, Teoria…, p. 165.
49 Ibidem. Cf. S. Wronkowska, op.cit., p. 173. The author says that the values on which the 
lawmaker rests its decisions can be described as either substantial or formal. 
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by law, along with the indeterminate concept of rationality, as did the 
drafters of the criminal code in the successive explanatory memoranda 
in the early 1990s. It is worth noting that the formal understanding of 
rationality makes it possible to recognise the legal norms which realise 
the values adopted under the plebiscite procedure as rational. In this 
context, it will be worthwhile citing Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde”s 
opinion as a criticism of the conception of the axiological grounding 
of law. He argues that they invoke a changeable, temporary factor, an 
ethical consensus that in a pluralistic society undergoes frequent change 
and gives no guarantee of rightness. This conception abandons any veri-
fication of the consensus against external criteria and adopts it rather 
as an unquestioned benchmark. In this way, the axiological grounding 
of law surreptitiously succumbs to a new kind of positivism—a posi-
tivism of popular evaluations.50 What is more, they can be very easily 
legitimated by referring to the criterion of rationality, which is after all 
understood subjectively. Hence, we are dealing with, in Böckenförde”s 
words, a sociological or socio-cultural justification of law, rather than 
a philosophical one. “Invoking values and the concept of value is thus 
not a sufficient response to the indefeasible question, arising out of the 
very essence of law, about its meta-positivist reason and foundation”.51 
Considering the question of the axiological foundations of criminal 
law, gives rise to the thought not only of the rational creation of crimi-
nal law, but also of the creation of rational law, which in fact must be 
assessed according to different criteria, and which will not be touched 
upon here. The issue is a statutory law that is an “instrument of justice” 
and not its source, while the attained social (political) consensus is not 
the ultimate foundation of law. “There are rational grounds for question-
50 E.-W. Böckenförde, Prawo i wartości, o krytyce idei aksjologicznego ugruntowania prawa, 
“Znak” 1992, no. 11, p. 67.
51 Ibidem. In the conceptions of axiological grounding of law, in E-W. Böckenförde’s opinion, 
moral values lack any rational grounding also in this sense that their foundation is non-
discursive: a discussion is an exchange of views on what is considered right and not on what 
the grounds for considering something right are. 
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ing the will of a majority. Allowing for such a possibility is necessary 
if one is serious about human rights”.52 From the perspective of conceiv-
ing values in the philosophy of action “… human rights […] are not 
a proclamation of one of many (broadly equivalent) systems of values, 
but they have their meta-positive justification, reaching all the way to 
who a human being is”.53 Ziembiński writes:
Without adopting a specific ontology of the human being, without escha-
tological assumptions as to what the sense, purpose, tasks of h man life 
are, what its destiny is and other assumptions of this kind, many disputes 
about moral values may be actually irresolvable or, in the undisclosed ab-
sence of common assumptions, may lead to only apparent settlements.54
Let us add here that such settlements, in accordance with a common-
ly held understanding of rationality, may actually be considered rational. 
9. Analysis of the concept of rationality makes one realise the ex-
tent to which this concept is misused in the colloquial understanding of 
enacted law and its application. The concept is in danger of taking on 
the role of a “code” or “cipher” which will ultimately shift its meaning 
to the opposite of rationality. We will be then dealing with a “modernist 
façon de parler” or a “modern-day rationality delusion”.55 
In the domain of criminal law, the understanding of “rationality”, as 
many other issues, has been developed “on its own terms”. Kaiser as-
sociates it with a planned, non-self-contradictory, “moderate” shaping 
of criminal-law social control. It takes into account the recognised prin-
ciples of criminal-policy and, in addition, meets the conditions of trans-
52 M. Piechowiak, op. cit.
53 Ibidem.
54 Z. Ziembiński, O stanowieniu…, p. 95. V. a critical statement by Ziembiński on the discus-
sions held by criminal law theorists and views expressed in judicial decisions on this ques-
tion: Etyczne problemy prawoznawstwa, Wrocław 1972, pp. 188–189. 
55 H. Schiiler-Springorum, op. cit., p. 177. “Among even serious scholars, calling some be-
haviour rational in a given situation, is sometimes considered an expression that does not 
require any relativisation”. Z. Ziembiński, Metodologiczne…, op.cit., p. 118.
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parency and verifiability, satisfies the duty to provide a justification, and 
can be corrected.56 Heinz Zipf, in turn, counts “rationality” among the 
three principal requirements underpinning any criminal policy, along-
side “practicality” and “effectiveness”. By “rationality”, he means a “ju-
dicious” implementation of a basic concept in the fight against crime, 
together with the “component elements” of such a concept. Zipf also 
recalls a well-known but ignored truth, namely that criminal-law dog-
matics does not lend itself to being defined as an aim in itself, but rather 
all its pronouncements ought to be judged in the light of the overall 
conception of criminal policy.57 However, as Kaiser emphasises, a “ho-
listic” theory or conception of a rational criminal policy has yet to be 
developed, and the prospects for creating such a conception are viewed 
as bleak.58 Stratenwerth comes across as downright pessimistic, since he 
writes that whenever a scientifically credible answer is sought in a mat-
ter of importance for criminal law, it transpires that most of the time 
such an answer still does not exist, and may never be provided with suf-
ficient accuracy.59 However, in a way, this is arguably a natural state of 
affairs. For instance, nobody can estimate the extent of actual damage 
caused by a single offence. In this situation, Stratenwerth maintains, all 
we can do is to “retreat in shame towards common sense, which, as 
a matter of fact, is hard to come by”.60 Indicating the limitations in the 
application of scientific arguments, Stratenwerth comes up with a high-
ly pertinent reflection: We can certainly draw scientific conclusions as 
to what norms must be protected by criminal law in order to preserve 
a given social order, but science will be of no help to us in the attempt 
to answer the fundamental question of whether this order deserves to be 
supported in the first place.61
56 G. Kaiser, op.cit., p. 742.
57 H. Zipf, op.cit., pp. 53–54.
58 G. Kaiser, op.cit., p. 742.
59  G. Stratenwerth, Leitprinzipien der Strafrechtsreform, “Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung 
des Landes Nordrein-Westfalen” 1970, vol. 162, p. 21. Cit. per L. Gardocki, op.cit., p. 101.
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem.
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